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NOTES
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES No LONGER INCLUDE RIGHT To MAKE UNILATERAL
DECISION To SUBCONTRACT

Within the context of continued high unemployment, a number of labor-

management problems are taking on added importance. Problems of the first magnitude arise when management decides to reduce the number of jobs available to
its present employees - either by a decision to automate or to relocate' or to contract out work which previously has been done by its own employees. A member
of the National Labor Relations Board, John H. Fanning, recently outlined some
of the major considerations involved in such decisions:
Today the twin problems of chronic unemployment and automation
have given greater dimension to the issues involved; the economic climate
surrounding bargaining as to subcontracting or curtailment of operations has
become more acute in an economy where upwards of 4 -5 million employable
men and women find themselves unemployed. In many cases employers find it

more economical or efficient to shut down certain operations, automate them
or subcontract to other employers who have already undergone automation.

The result often is that a one-industry town, or indeed any town with a
dominant industry finds its industry gone and its people unemployed. In
other cases unions, fearing unemployment for their members, demand that

no employee be discharged, relying upon work rules which in2 recent times
have subjected these unions to charges of "featherbedding."

Focusing on the problem of subcontracting, in two recent decisions, Town
and Country Mfg. Co. 3 and FibreboardPaper Prod. Corp.,4 the National Labor
Relations Board has held that a decision to subcontract is not for management
alone but rather that management is required to bargain with the bargaining
representative when the decision results in the loss of unit jobs, even if the reasons
for the decision were economic and nondiscriminatory. Until these cases, it had
generally been assumed that an unfair labor practice would not be found in a
subcontracting situation without discriminatory behavior by the employer.
The National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees; 5
that is, refusing "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment...,,6
A subject falling within the terms "wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment," is considered to be a mandatory subject for collective bargaining - one that must be bargained about if either management or labor so
desires. The effect of the Board's decisions in Town and Country and in Fibreboard was thus to make the decision to subcontract a mandatory bargaining subject.
The Supreme Court considers the scope of the statutory bargaining duty to
be quite broad: "effective collective bargaining has been generally conceded to
include the right of the representatives of the unit to be consulted to bargain7
about the exceptional as well as the routine rates, rules, and working conditions."
1

See Note, Runaway Shop -

LAWYER

2

357 (1962).

A PerennialThreat To Organized Labor, 37
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Address by NLRB Member John H. Fanning, Ninth Annual Institute of Labor Law,

Southwestern Legal Foundation, Oct. 19, 1962; 3 COH 1962 Lab. L. Rep. § 8131; 14
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L. J., 18, 23 (1963). See also Fanning, The National Labor Relations Board and Stare
Decisis 7-8, An address before 4th Annual Industrial Relations Conference, Fibre Box Assn.National Paperboard Assn., Chicago, March 5, 1963.
3 136 NLRB 1022 (1962). (Appeal pending before Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.)
4 138 NLRB No. 67 (1962). (Appeal pending before D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.)
5 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (5) (1958).
(Commonly referred to as § 8(a) (5).)
6 Id. at 158(d). (Commonly referred to as § 8(a)(5).)
7 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 347
(1944).
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Following this directive the courts and the Board have held that such matters as
termination of employment by' discharge or retirement,8 layoffs,9, transfers,." reemployment," recall,12 reinstatement of strikers,13 seniority, 4 downgrading, 35 grievances, 16 changes in working hourslr or working schedules Is and even disputes concerning coffee breaks,' 9 fall within "conditions of employment," and thus are mandatory bargaining subjects. When viewed in this context, subcontracting, when it
results in the loss of unit jobs, seems to fit quite readily within "conditions of
employment."
Spokesmen for management, on the other hand, maintain that the decision
to subcontract fits just as readily within the framework of management prerogatives,
and thus is not and should not be a mandatory bargaining subject. Subjects such
as the corporate or other structure of the business, the composition of the official
and supervisory force, general business practices, the products to be manufactured,
the location of plants, the schedule of production, and the methods, processes, and
means of manufacturing
have been traditionally thought of as the prerogatives
20
of management.

I.

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES.

Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act 2' in 1935, there has
been a contraction of these matters which are within the scope of management
alone to decide - the so-called management prerogatives.2 2 The Board and the
courts have held that such items as company housing,23 pensions, 24 group insurance, 25 Christmas bonuses, 26 and work schedules 7 are mandatory bargaining subjects,
and thus no longer to be considered as manage~nent prerogatives. So, it is not
possible to determine what is bargainable merely by looking to what was commonly
the subject of labor-management negotiation in 1935, as has been contended.2
How then have the courts and the Board reached conclusions as to whether
a given subject is a mandatory bargaining subject or is within management prerogative? At times, the courts have seemed to base the decision on whether the
topics were "frequent subjects of negotiation." 29 But usually the conclusion is reached
that a given subject is within the statutory terms "wages, hours, and other terms
8
9
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
Michalek, d.b.a. Service Metal Industries, 96 NLRB 10 (1951).
Administrative Decision of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. F-1105 (1959).
Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 NLRB 984 (1941).
West Boylston Mfg. Co., 87 NLRB 808 (1949).
Washoughal Woolen Mills, 23 NLRB 1 (1940).
Belanger v. Local Division No. 1128, 254 Wis. 344, 36 N.W.2d 414 (1949).
Bergen Point Iron Works, 79 NLRB 1073 (1948).
Arundel Corp., 59 NLRB 505 (1944).
Oughton v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1941).
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 NLRB 500 (1946).
Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 NLRB 452 (1957).
20 2CCH 1961 LAB. L. REP. § 3020.
21 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1946).
22 See Inland Steel Co., 77 NLRB 1, 27 (1948), enforcement granted, 170 F.2d 247
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). The intermediate report of the Board stated:
It is well known, however, that over the years of negotiations between
unions and employers, the accepted subject matter of collective bargaining
has expanded, so that presently various subjects which were formerly
deemed to be reserved as "management prerogatives" are bargained about.
23 Bemis Brothers Bag Co., 96 NLRB 728 (1951).
24 Inland Steel Co., 77 NLRB 1 (1948) enforcement granted, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
25 Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 NLRB 360 (1952).
26 NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
27 Hallan & Boggs Truck & Implement Co., 95 NLRB 1443 (1951).
28 W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 877-78 (1st Cir. 1949); Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
29 National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940); NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
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and conditions of employment,"3 0 with no further rationale offered.31 It has been
suggested that implicit in such decisions is an evaluation of the relative strengths
of the interests of management and of those
of labor in the subject, resulting in a
32
case by case balancing of those interests.
The concept of mandatory bargaining subjects is based, of course, on the National Labor Relations Act, but it is not so clear on what basis the concept of management prerogative is founded. Three possibilities emerge - either management
prerogatives are rooted in legislation, or are conferred by contract, or are the natural
product of the manager's position. Since the labor-management statutes are silent
on the subject, the first possibility must be rejected as the source. If the second
possibility is accepted - if management prerogatives are derived from contract then clearly without a contract containing a management prerogative clause, management has no rights. This theory hardly seems acceptable, especially when one
is confronted with a realistic account of the historical development of the collective
bargaining process. It should be noted, though, that management
rights can be ex33
panded by contract to include even mandatory subjects.
Thus, the third theory - that management prerogatives are the natural product or right of the manager's position - remains to be scrutinized. In support of this
theory, it has been stated that:
We ourselves, as human beings, have certain needs that come from our
nature. We have the right to life and to the means of sustaining life. One
of the basic means is the institution of private property, an institution that
is antecedent to our established laws. With the right to private property
there go other rights, one of which is the right to control the management
and distribution of property for the benefit of the owner and the welfare of
the community. One who owns a business, then, is entitled either to control
it himself or to hire a deputy, his manager, to manage it for him.
By the very nature of these institutions that we hold to be fundamental,
the one who owns or manages must control. True, the extent and exercise
of the control are mitigated by circumstances of time and place. It is true
too that one who controls the means of production and who hires the labor
of others to assist him in his enterprise owes a duty to his employees. 34
This theory as to the source of management rights seems realistically to coincide with the historical development of the collective bargaining process, and is
compatible with our traditional notions in regard to property rights.
While it is true that the concept of mandatory bargaining subjects comes
from the National Labor Relations Act, it should be noted that the rights of labor
are not based solely on legislation. Working men as well as property owners find
certain inalienable rights inherent in man as man. Therefore, when the conflict
between management prerogative and mandatory bargaining subject is brought
clearly into focus, it is viewed as a contest between property rights, statutory rights,
and the rights of man as man. In such a situation, the method of evaluating the
relative strengths of the interests of labor and management in the topic - a case
by case balancing of interests - seems to be not only proper, but essential to a just
determination.
In regard to the decision to subcontract both sides are able to find support
for their respective positions in the case law. The chief policy argument advanced
in support of the position that the decision to subcontract is a mandatory bargaining
subject is the contention that such a requirement promotes labor-management peace
and cooperation, and thus avoids potential strife.33

30 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. 1948).
31 Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
32 Note, 50 COLUM. L. Rlv. 351, 356 (1950).
33 NLRB v. American National L. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
34 O'Shaughnessy, Management Rights: Control or Anarchy, 8 LABOR L.J. 25, 40 (1959).
35 Brief for NLRB as Respondent, pp. 60-74, Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB
F.2d - (5th Cir. 1963).
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II.

SUBCONTRACTING DECISIONS.

A. The Changing Law.
In the Town and Country case, the Board held that the employer, by unilaterally entering into a subcontract by which its trucking department was discontinued, without consulting the duly designated representative of its drivers,
violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. At the time of the decision to subcontract
there was no collective bargaining agreement in existence between the employer
and the union which had just been certified as the employees' representative.
Although it found that the employer's motive for contracting out the work
was discriminatory in nature, and as such was an unfair labor practice, the Board
felt that this was immaterial, and went on to hold that even if the decision to subcontract was based on economic considerations, there still would have been a violation, since such a decision presented a mandatory bargaining subject.36 The Board
outlined in detail what it felt this obligation entailed:
This obligation to bargain in nowise restrains an employer from formulating or effectuating an economic decision to terminate a phase of his business operations. Nor does it obligate him to yield to a union's demand that
a subcontract not be let, or that it be let on terms inconsistent with management's business judgment. Experience has shown, however, that candid
discussion of mutual problems by labor and management frequently results
in their resolution with attendant benefit to both sides. Business operations
may profitably continue and jobs may be preserved. Such prior discussion
with a duly designated bargaining
representative is all that the Act contem3s
plates. But it commands no less.

Based on the language of its opinion in Town and Country, the Board felt
justified in granting a rehearing and subsequently reversing its earlier decision s, in
the Fibreboard case. In this case, the motives for an employer's decision to discontinue the jobs of fifty maintenance and powerhouse workers and contract out
the work were found to be economic in nature. Nevertheless, the Board held that the
failure of the employer to bargain with the union concerning its decision constituted a violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The
Board made it clear that it was not holding that a decision to contract out work
is foreclosed to management unless a decision is negotiated which is satisfactory
to the union. 39 All that it held was that such a decision is a mandatory subject for

collective bargaining. The Board felt that its conclusion in Fibreboardwas dictated
by the Supreme Court's decisions in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago &
Northwestern
R. Co.240 Teamsters Union v. Oliver,4' and Steelworkers v. Warrior
42
& Gulf Co.
B. Previous Board Decisions.
Having reached the Board's decisions in Town and Country and Fibreboard,
it will now be the purpose of this section to explore previous decisions, from the
Board itself and from the courts, with regard to subcontracting and to show how
the previous decision did, or did not, bolster the Board's decision.
Authority can be found to support the majority's decision in a number of
previous National Labor Relation Board cases, even where discriminatory motives
were not expressly found. In Timken Roller Bearing Co.,4 3 the Board found that
the employer had violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by his refusal to bargain
about his intention to subcontract out work in the future, although it was not clear
from the opinion, however, where the motives for subcontracting were economic
36
37
38
39
UAW,
40
41
42
43

Town and Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB 1022, 1026 (1962).
Id. at 1027.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 130 NLRB 1558 (1961).
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 NLRB No. 67 at p. 2 (1962). Compare
Local 391 v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
362 U.S. 330 (1962).
358 U.S. 283 (1959).
362 U.S. 574 (1960).
70 NLRB 500 (1946); rev'd on other grounds,'161 F.2d, 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
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or discriminatory in nature. In a somewhat analogous situation the Board held, in
Brown Truck & TrailerMfg. Co.,' that the company had violated Section 8(a) (5)
by failing to advise the petitioning union of the establishment of a new plant, and
thus depriving the union of the opportunity to bargain _s to the possible transfer
of employees to the new plant. And in Shamrock Dairy Co.,45 the Board concluded

that the employer had violated Section (a) (5) by failing to bargain with the
union as to whether the company should adopt the independent contractor system
of distribution. Adoption of this system was equivalent to the elimination of the
jobs of the union's members and the contracting out of the work previously done
by them.
Once it is shown that the employer has made any decision - including the
decision to subcontract - in an effort to discriminate against union membership,
that employer has committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Sections
8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 6
An employer that accelerated the effective date of its change in operations,
which amounted to a discontinuance of its transportation department and the subcontracting out of the work previously done by that department, in order to avoid
recognition of and bargaining with the union, was held to violate Sections 8(a) (3)
and 8(a) (5) in Consumers Gasoline Stations.47 This case is, of course, distinguishable from second Fibreboardsince the reasons for the employer's decision here were
discriminatory in nature, while in Fibreboard they were of an economic nature.
However, this case is similar to Town & Country, where the decision was also based
on discriminatory reasons.
In Herman Nelson Division, American Air Filter Co., Inc.,4 8 the employer
abolished its guard department, subcontracted out the work, and transferred the
guards to other jobs. Only after it had completed these actions, did it meet with
the union to advise it of these facts. The Board held that, by its actions, the
employer had committed an unfair labor practice - its motives were explicitly
found to be discriminatory.
The dissent in second Fibreboard also can find authority for its position in
previous Board decisions.49 However, this support aside from the now-reversed first
Fibreboard, comes from cases decided before 1950. In Mahoning Mining Co. 50
the Board determined that the company did not exercise sufficient control over certain individuals to establish an employer-employee relationship, and thus, that
the company did not violate 8(a) (5) by failing to bargain in regard to these
individuals. In the course of its opinion, the Board stated:
The Board has never held that once it has established an appropriate
unit for bargaining purposes, an employer may not in good faith, without
regard to union organization of employees, change his business structure,
sell, or contract out a portion of his operations, or make any like change
which might affect the constituency of the appropriate unit without first
consulting the bargaining51 representative of the employees affected by the
proposed business change.

In Walter Holm and Co. 5 2 the Board stated that Section 8(a) (5) does not

require an employer to consult with its employees' representative as a prerequisite
to going out of business for nondiscriminatory reasons.5 3 Since going out of business
44
45

106 NLRB 999 (1953).
124 NLRB 494 (1959).

46 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1), (3) (1958).
47 126 NLRB 1041 (1960).
48 127 NLRB 939 (1960).
49 In evaluating previous Board decisions, the political responsiveness of the Board should
be kept in mind. See Note, The NLRB Under Republican Administration: Recent Trends
And Their Political Implications, 55 CoLuM. L. REv. 852 (1955).
50 61 NLRB 792 (1945).
51 Id. at 803.
52 87 NLRB 1169 (1949).
53 Id. at 1172.
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is somewhat analogous to the discontinuance of a department or business unit and
the contracting out of the work previously handled by that department or unit,
this case would seem to lend support to the dissent's conclusion in second Fibreboard.
C. The Issue as Developed by the Courts.
The dissent's position receives considerable support, however, from decisions
in the United States Courts of Appeals. In NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc.,5 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the decision as to whether the
employer would move his business to another area was within managerial discretion,
and did not have to be submitted for collective bargaining. The court did find a
violation of 8(a) (5) however, in the action of the employer in failing to give notice
to the union of the move, and thus failing to discuss the treatment to be accorded
displaced workers. This decision is very similar to the first Fibreboardcase, where
the Board held that the employer had a duty to bargain in regard to termination
rights and benefits, but no duty to bargain about its decision to contract out the
work.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Jay Foods, Inc. v. NLRB,55
that where the employer's sole reason for abolishing its auto repair department,
discharging the employees therein, and contracting out the work was an economic
one, that there was no violation of 8(a) (5) although the employer did not bargain
with the union in regard to such decisions. The court based its decision, at least
in part, on the first Fibreboardcase, and on the fact that there was no bargaining
agreement in effect between the union and the employer.
In NLRB v. Lassing,56 the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board's decision in Consumers Gasoline Stations,57 and found that the change in operations was not made
for discriminatory reasons. The court went on to say that since the business was
legally terminated for economic reasons, that there was no basis for meeting later
with the union for collective bargaining. This conclusion appears contrary to the
one reached by the Second Circuit in the Rapid Bindery8 case.
Situations involving the closing of company departments and the contracting
out of the work previously handled by these departments were brought before the
courts in NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 59 NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 9 and
NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co."' In none of these cases did the courts consider
directly the question of whether a management decision to contract work out of an
existing unit was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. However, there is
language in all of these cases to the effect that such a decision is solely a managerial
one, and thus the implication is left that such a decision is not a mandatory bargaining subject.
The case of NLRB v. New MadridMfg. Co. 6 2 involved a predecessor-employer

who closed one of its plants and sold its machinery to a successor-employer, who
opened a plant at a new location. In the course of its opinion, the court spoke of
the absolute right of an employer to permanently close and go out of business. 3
The dissent in the second Fibreboard case cited this opinion in support of the
proposition that the decision to go out of business completely or to discontinue a
department is the decision solely of management.0 4
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961).
284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1961).
126 NLRB 1041 (1960).
NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959).
226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).
211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954).
Id. at 914.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 NLRB No. 67 at p. 13 (1962).
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Support for the Board's Decision
The- Courts of Appeals have not left the Board's majority without support. In
a recent decision, the Seventh Circuit went well beyond the position advocated
by the Board in Town and Country and second Fibreboard. The court held in
UAW, Local 391 v. Webster Elec. Co., 5 that an employer could not contract out
the work previously done by its maintenance department, without the consent of
the union. The court based its decision on the fact that a union shop agreement
was in existence between the employer and the union at the time. It was decided
that the right to contract out was inconsistent with such a union shop agreement.
Apparently, the court's unstated premise was that a union shop agreement means
that one who is not a union member shall not do the employer's work, unless the
union consents. This seems to be a very broad interpretation of the meaning of a
union shop agreement. It is normally understood that, by entering into such an
agreement, an employer promises only that it will employ only those employees who
join the union within one month after employment. 6 Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act supports the normal interpretation; it is written in terms
of "employees," not in terms that would include anyone who does the employer's
work, such as an independent contractor. The Act itself expressly states in Section
2(3) that the term "employee" shall not include any individual having the status
of an independent contractor.6 It would therefore appear that the court's conclusion
that the right to contract out is inconsistent with a union shop agreement is, itself
inconsistent with the Act.
The Tenth Circuit considered a case very similar to Town and Country when
it decided NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co.6" In that case, the court affirmed the
Board's finding that the employer had violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by
failing and refusing the union an opportunity to bargain in regard to its decision
to subcontract out work being done by its employees. No collective bargaining agreement was in existence, but the union had been duly certified as the bargaining agent
for the employees involved. The Board found, and the court agreed, that the
motives for contracting out the work were discriminatory in nature.
After reaching the conclusion that under the circumstances of the case the
union was not given a fair opportunity to bargain with the employer about not
subcontracting the work, or with the new employer under the subcontract concerning the conditions of the new employment the court stated:
This is not to say that the Union must first approve before an employer
may contract out work, but it is to say that reasonable notice and a chance
to bargain must be afforded before an employer enters into a contract affecting the hire or tenure of its Union workers employment. This is so because
"Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining.
It interferes with the right of self-organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent." 65
While this decision lends much weight to the Board's holding in Town and
Country, it should be pointed out that no statement is made by the court on the
materiality or immateriality of the employer's discriminatory motives. However,
65 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
66 CCH 1963 LAB. L. COURSE 2742.
67 29 U.S.C. at 152(3). It should also be pointed out that if the independent contractor
employs individuals to assist him in doing the work he has agreed to do, that such individuals
should not be considered to be employees of the primary employer. The Supreme Court
has stated:
We agree with the Board also in its conclusion that the fact that the contractor and the subcontractor were engaged on the same construction project, and that the contractor had some supervision over the subcontractor's
work, did not eliminate the status of each as an independent contractor
or make the employees of one the employees of the other. National Labor
Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675, 689-90 (1951).
68 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961).
69 Id. at 20.
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the reasoning and statements of the court, even taking into account this omission,
are consistent with the reasoning of the second Fibreboard decision, and then
should also lend some support to it on appeal.
As has been stated previously, the Board felt that its conclusion in the second
Fibreboard case was dictated by decisions of the Supreme Court - especially
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co.70 In that case, the
union notified the railroad that it wanted to negotiate with it, in order to amend
the current bargaining agreement to provide that no position then in existence
could be abolished without agreement. The railroad contended that no bargainable
issue was thereby presented, and thus it refused to negotiate with the union in
this regard. The District Court held that the proposal related to "rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions,"71 and that the railroad was therefore subject to
bargaining obligations. The Supreme Court agreed:
Plainly the controversy here relates to an effort on the part of the union
to change the "terms" of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The
change desired just as plainly referred to "conditions of employment" of
the railroad's employees who are represented by the union. . . . And, in
the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing strange about agreements that affect the permanency of employment. The District Court's finding that "Collective bargaining as to the length or term of employment is
commonplace," is not challenged.
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the union's effort to
negotiate about the job security of its members "represents an attempt to
usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of its business judgment with 72respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its
operations."

While it is true that the Telegraphers case was governed by the Railway
Labor Act, 73 and not the National Labor Relations Act,74 the courts have recognized the similarity of the bargaining obligation imposed by these Acts. In the
case of Elgin, Joliet, & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen,7 5
the Seventh Circuit recognized the substantial identity of the bargaining obligation
under these Acts. The court held, under the Railway Labor Act, that pensions
were mandatory subjects for collective bargaining, basing its decision on Inland
Steel v. NLRB 6 where the same result had been reached under the National Labor
Relations Act. In fact, in Inland Steel, the Court completed the circle by pointing
out that "other conditions of employment" in the National Labor Relations Act
was somewhat broader than the term "working conditions" used in the Railway

Labor Act. 77 The interplay between these cases affirms the Board's position in the
second Fibreboard case that the Telegraphers decision, though decided under the
Railway Act, is applicable to situations arising under the National Labor Relations
Act.
Soon after the Supreme Court decided the Telegraphers case, Senator Everett
Dirksen introduced a bill to amend the Norris-La Guardia Act, the National Labor
Relations Act, and the Railway Labor Act. His proposal was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, 78 where, apparently, no further action was taken. Dirksen
stated the bill's purpose: "All the bill does is to provide that the phrase 'terms of
conditions of employment' and related language in various acts do not include the
creation or discontinuance of jobs."7 9 Dirksen felt that such a change was necessitated
by the Supreme Court's decision in the Telegraphers case. He read the Supreme
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

362 U.S. 330 (1960).
44 Stat. 577 (1926). 45 U.S.C. 152 (1958).
Order of Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 336 (1960).
48 Stat. 926 (1926), 45 U.S.C. 151 (1958).
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141 (1958).
302 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1962).
170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
Id. at 255.
S. 3548, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 10232 (1960).
106 CoNG. REc. 10256 (1960).
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Court's opinion as affecting the bargaining obligation of an employer not only under
the Railway Labor Act, but also under the Labor Management Relations Act.
The Board's opinion in the second Fibreboardcase also finds support in two
other Supreme Court cases - Teamsters Union v. Oliver"0 and Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Co.8 ' The Oliver case concerned a collective bargaining agreement

between labor unions and interstate carriers. It set up a wage scale for truck drivers,
and to prevent evasion, it also provided that drivers who owned and drove their
own vehicles should be paid the prescribed wages, plus minimum rentals for the
use of their vehicles. The Supreme Court held that such a minimum rental provision
was within the scope of the collective bargaining
required of parties under Sections 7
82
and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.

It seems apparent that such a minimum rental provision is meant to discourage
an employer from contracting out work, and thus is aimed at preventing a progressive curtailment of jobs performed by union employees. If such a provision is within
the scope of the collective bargaining which the Act requires, and the Court has
said that it is, then to hold otherwise than that an employer's decision to contract
work out of an existing unit also presents a mandatory bargaining subject would be
inconsistent. The Court seemed to recognize this fact when it cited, in support of
its holding, Timken Roller Bearing Co.83 It will be remembered that the Board
held there that the employer had violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by his refusal
to bargain about his intention to subcontract out work in the future.
The case of Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co.s- involved a suit brought under.
the Labor Management Relations Act by a labor union to compel arbitration of
a grievance. The grievance was based upon the employer's practice of contracting
out work, while at the same time laying off employees who could have performed
such work. The collective bargaining agreement between the parties set up a
grievance procedure which culminated in arbitration. The agreement further provided that "matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration."85 It also provided, however, that "Should differences arise
• . . as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or
should any local trouble of any kind arise," ' 0, the grievance procedure should be
followed. The employer argued, as he had done so successfully before the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, that the decision to contract out work was
"strictly a function of management," and therefore not subject to arbitration. Under
these circumstances, the Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and held that
the question presented, whether the contracting out violated the agreement, was for
the arbitrator to decide. It based its decision, to a large extent, on its finding that
there was presented a dispute "as to the meaning and application of the provisions"
of the agreement, and that the parties had agreed that where such was the case
the determination was to be made by arbitration.
Although the Court did not state definitively whether or not the decision to
contract out work was "strictly a function of management," the tenor s7 of its
opinion and the fact that it reversed the lower courts would seem to indicate that
the Court did not consider it to be strictly a management function - and it has been
so interpreted. 8 If such a decision is not solely a management function, it is only

80 358 U.S. 283 (1959); 362 U.S. 605 (1960).
81 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
82 Teamster Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294-95 (1959).
83 70 NLRB 500 (1946); rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1947).
84 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
85 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 576 (1960).
86 Ibid.
87 Id. at 583-84.
88 Weiss, Labor Arbitration In The Federal Courts, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 285, 306
(1961).
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a short jump to the conclusion that it is a mandatory bargaining subject, since
"terms and conditions of employment"8 9 seems broad enough to embrace it.
III. GOOD FAITH BARGAINING.
In explaining the requirement of the National Labor Relations Act that an
employer must bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Senator Walsh, stated:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them
to the door of the employer and say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens behind those °doors is not inquired
into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.9

But the concept of good faith bargaining has been considerably altered since
1935, and when the Board states, as it did in second Fibreboard,that when it holds
that subcontracting is a mandatory bargaining subject, all that is required is a
"candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and management," 9' it 'certainly
understates the effect of its decision.
The Board and the courts have held that collective bargaining requires "an
open and fair mind ' 92 when entering into negotiations; when the employer "seals
his mind" 93 he is guilty of an unfair labor practice. There is the further duty
imposed on the parties "to discuss freely and fully their respective claims and
demands, and, when these are opposed, to justify them on reason." 94
Good faith bargaining can, and often does, require more than just an open
and free discussion. Where certain material is deemed relevant and necessary to
informed bargaining, the employer will be required to furnish it to the union upon
request. In the Truitt Mfg. Co.95 case, the United States Supreme Court ordered
enforcement of a Board decision that an employer must submit to the union demand to furnish financial data to substantiate its claim that it could not afford to
pay higher wages.
In similar circumstances, employers have been required to furnish information concerning individual earnings,9 s job rates and classification, 97 merit increases, 98 pension insurance,9 9 time studies, 00 incentive earnings,' 0 ' and piece rates, 0 2
in order to meet the conditions of good faith collective bargaining. This trend has
been viewed in the following manner:
emhe law now regulates the way in which the parties are to deal with
each other. It tells them what they may do and what they may not do,
even though each recognizes the authority of the other and honestly seeks
to reach an agreement. .

.

. In Senator Walsh's metaphor, the law

has crossed the threshold into the conference room and now looks over
89

49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1958).

90

79 CoNG. REc. 7660 (1935).

91 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 NLRB No. 67 at 3 (1962).
92 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v.
Boss, 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941). See also Singer Mfg.Co. v.NLRB, 119 F.2d 131,
134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); Wilson & Co. v.NLRB, 115 F.2d 759
(8th Cir. 1940).
93 NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004, 1006 (3rd Cir. 1941).
94 NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941).
95 110 NLRB 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), reversed,
351 U.S. 149 (1956).
96 NLRB v.F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956).
97 Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v.NLRB, 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956).
98 NLRB v.J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
814 (1948).
99 Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 NLRB 360, 366 (1952).
100 NLRB v.Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).
101 Dixie Mfg.Co., Inc., 79 NLRB 645 (1948), enforcement granted, 180 F.2d 173 (6th
Cir. 1950).
102 Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 NLRB 1116 (1948), enforcement granted, 180 F.2d 173
(6th Cir. 1950).
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the negotiator's
shoulder. Is the next step to take a seat at the bargaining table?1 03

The dissent in second Fibreboard,which considered "the numerous technical
vagaries, practical uncertainties, and changing concepts"'0 4 in the area of good
faith bargaining felt that if the ruling that subcontracting is a mandatory bargaining subject stood, that future management actions on such a topic must be taken
at managements' peril. Since such an observation could be validly made in regard to any mandatory bargaining subject, it does not materially strengthen the
argument against holding subcontracting as such a subject.
If the Board's decision stands - if subcontracting is held to be a subject for
mandatory bargaining then it can be expected that management will be required to furnish such information as is deemed necessary for informed bargaining. It will probably be required to supply financial data to substantiate any claim
that subcontracting would result in economic benefit to the company. It is difficult
to predict what the outer limits of the concept of relevant data necessary for informed bargaining might be,10 5 but it has been held that an employer is not required to furnish a list of names and manufacturers to whom it has subcontracted
work, even though the union has requested such data. 0 This decision was rendered,
however, before the Board had clearly decided the question of whether subcontracting is a mandatory subject.
The Board's position in second Fibreboardthat, after the parties have exhausted
the processes of good faith bargaining, management is no longer under any legal
constraint not to contract work out of an existing unit has recently received analogous support. The Supreme Court has held in discussing a dispute under the
Railway Labor Act that: "What is clear, rather, is that both parties, having exhausted all of the statutory procedures, are relegated to self-help in adjusting this
dispute."''
In effect, this decision left management free from legal restraints to
reach a unilateral decision to abolish 65,000-80,000 jobs. Labor, of course, also
became free to resort to self-help - the strike.
IV.

SECTION (8) (E) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.

Assuming that bargaining between the employer and the union reaches the
point where a contract is to be entered into, there is a question as to the legality
of a clause in which the employer agrees not to subcontract. It has been suggested
that the new subsection, 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act proscribes all
agreements that limit the right of an employer to contract out w6rk, 08 except such
agreements in the construction or clothing industries. Section 8(e) provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of
the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible
and void ....
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Contrary to the position that all agreements limiting subcontracting are void
is the general understanding that Section 8(e) was limited to the outlawing of
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Cox, The Duty To Bargain In Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1402-3 (1958).

104 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 NLRB No. 67 at 13 (1962).
105 In Marathon-Clark Cooperative Dairy Ass'n., 137 NLRB No. 91, 50 LAB. REL. REF.
1285 (1962), arising out of bargaining concerning subcontracting, the Board found the employer guilty of bad faith bargaining because he "point blank" refused a union request that
an efficiency expert be brought in.
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"hot cargo" agreements - "those that permit the covered employees to refuse
to work on the 'hot' goods of producers or shippers who have been declared 'unfair' by the union.""10 The limitation on the scope of this section was supported
by the Board's General Counsel: "clauses of this character (prohibiting or restricting subcontracting) however are not precisely in the same vein as the kind
of 'hot cargo' provision which was much litigated under the Taft-Hartley Act and
which apparently prompted enactment of section 8(e)."'1 And Archibald Cox,
now the Solicitor General of the United States, also supports such an interpretation. He has written that:
Although the language leaves doubt, the underlying rationale should
also .exclude from Section 8(e) conventional restrictions upon subcontracting such as the promise that: "All work that is usually performed in
the plants of the company shall continue to be performed in
11 2 such plants
unless a change is mutually agreed upon by both parties."

The Board had indicated in Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 546,1"
that it does not feel that Section 8(e) bars all such agreements, and that it intends
to look at each agreement in the light of the facts surrounding it, in order to determine whether it contravenes the subsection.
Since then, it has been found that Section 8(e) was violated by agreements
under which preference for subcontracting was to be given to shops having contracts with the union, 1 4 or at least approved by the union." 5 The Board has also
held that a subcontracting clause which barred the employer's use of the services
of anyone who failed to observe the wages, hours, and conditions of employment
established by the unions having jurisdiction over such services violated the 8(e)
prohibition." 6
V. CONCLUSION.
As the law now stands, prior to review by the Circuit Courts, an employer
cannot make a unilateral decision to subcontract - at least when such action
would result in the "elimination of unit jobs.""17 The focus is thus on the effect
of the decision to subcontract on the present bargaining unit. With such a focus,
the Board's prohibition on unilateral decisions to subcontract logically can be extended to those instances where the prior practice of the employer was to have
bargaining unit employees perform a task that was not continual, but where he
now wishes a subcontractor to perform the task; or where the operation in question is a new one, never previously performed by any unit employees, but is one
that they are capable of performing and is to be continued on a regular basis.
Those subcontracting decisions which will not fall within the scope of the Board's
opinion will be especially those "one-shot" affairs where the employer has had a
prior history of subcontracting, or where there is a practice in the industry to subcontract such work, or where an "emergency" compels that the work be done immediately." 8
With the focus of the instant decisions being on the effect of the subcontracting
3 CCH 1961 LAB. L. REP. § 5222.
111 Address by NLRB General Counsel Stuart Rothman, Emory University School of Law,
Feb. 12, 1960; 45 L.R.R.M. 78, 85 (1960). For a discussion, by Rothman, of the Town and
Country case see Rothman, Four Areas Of The Developing Law-Resume And Rationale 27-39,
An address before Labor Law Section, Wisconsin Bar Assn., Milwaukee, Feb. 15, 1963.
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118 For standards established under arbitration awards, see Reynolds Metals Co. (Corpus
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on the bargaining unit, it does not seem that whether the area subcontracted is
of "substantial importance" or is merely an "incidental feature" to the total production operation will be of any relevance to future decisions. 19
The varied factual situations which can give rise to subcontracting indicate
that no one, black-letter rule can be extracted from the Board's decision. Rather,
it must be recognized that "a ruling in any subcontracting case may be firmly
grounded in the facts and equities of the specific situation and . ..can seldom, if
ever, serve as a controlling precedent for similar cases arising in the future." 120
Thus, although the Board has indicated its decision when bargaining unit employees
are laid off, it is difficult to predict from this what decision will be made by it in
a different factual situation. It is expected that arbitrators will follow the Board's
lead, and thus will construe management prerogative clauses, so long as these clauses
do not explicitly include subcontracting as a management right, as not including
the decision to contract out, when such action would result in the elimination of
unit jobs.
N. Patrick Crooks
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